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James E. Pesando 
University of Toronto
Increased attention is being paid to the similarities and differences 
between Canada and the United States in a variety of areas of social 
policy. The similarities provide elements of a natural experiment to 
facilitate controlling for the myriad of observable and unobservable 
factors that can affect behavior. They also make it more likely that the 
experiences in one country have relevance for the other country. The 
differences provide variation in a number of factors that are of interest 
for their possible impact on behavior. The differences are especially of 
interest when they involve variables that are subject to a degree of pol 
icy control.
These similarities and differences have been exploited in a number 
of areas of social policy. Card and Freeman (1993) analyzed the 
impact of differences in labor-market and social policies on various 
outcomes, including wage and income inequality, poverty, union den 
sity, unemployment, and immigration. Chiswick (1992) looked at the 
impact of differences in immigration and language policies on such 
factors as immigrant assimilation, fertility, domestic earnings, lan 
guage fluency, and the economic returns to that fluency.
The purpose of this chapter is to outline important similarities and 
differences between Canada and the United States in public pension 
plans. While the focus is on public pension plans, brief mention is 
made of private pensions, so as to put the public plans in perspective. 
Particular attention is paid to the potential redistributive and incentive
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effects of the public plans, especially as they may shed light on the 
trend towards earlier retirement.
The chapter begins with a description of the different components 
of the Canadian public pension system, emphasizing features that have 
potential redistributive and incentive effects. Private employer-spon 
sored occupational pension plans are briefly discussed, and the impor 
tance of both public and private pension plans are documented as 
sources of retirement income. The extent to which public pension 
plans serve to replace preretirement earnings is documented, as are 
their potential redistributive effects. Intergenerational transfers 
implied by the "pay-as-you-go" financing are then analyzed as is the 
shift in policy emphasis from public to private pensions. A similar but 
briefer description of the U.S. public pension system is provided, and 
the similarities and differences are used to shed light on the trend in 
both countries to reward earlier retirement. The paper concludes with 
a brief summary of the salient points.
PUBLIC PENSION PROGRAMS IN CANADA
The public pension programs provided by the Government of Can 
ada consist of three components: 1) Old Age Security (OAS) payable 
to all Canadians aged 65 and over regardless of means; 2) an incomes- 
tested supplement (the Guaranteed Income Supplement or GIS) pay 
able, upon application, to recipients of the basic OAS pension who 
have little or no other income; and 3) an earnings-related component 
(the Canada Pension Plan or CPP) linked to an individual's average 
lifetime earnings. 1 The basic features of these public pension programs 
are summarized in Table 1. Unlike the situation in the United States, 
health insurance is provided under the universal public programs in 
each of the provinces, and coverage is unaffected by retirement status.
Old Age Security (OAS)
Old Age Security is a demogrant, financed out of general tax reve 
nues and payable to those aged 65 and older and with 40 years of resi 
dence. It is a flat-rate, universal benefit unrelated to work history. It
Table 1 Public Pension Programs: Government of Canada
Program Nature Benefit Financing
Old Age Security (OAS)
Guaranteed Income 
Supplement (GIS)
Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
Demogrant payable to those over 65 Maximum annual pension is General tax revenues 
subject to residency requirement; $3,472; fully indexed to CPI 
benefits reduced for Canadians 
with incomes over $39,911
Income-tested benefit; recipient Maximum annual pension is General tax revenues 
must be over age 65 and in receipt $4,127; reduced by 50% of recipient's 
of OAS pension income in excess of OAS benefits;
not taxable and fully indexed to CPI
Earnings-related; designed to 
replace 25% of average lifetime 
earnings, up to the average 
industrial wage
Maximum annual pension is 
$6,250; fully indexed to CPI
Equal employer/employee 
contributions, set at 2.6% of 
earnings between $3,300 and 
$33,400
NOTE All amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January 
1, 1994. The provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Ontano, and Saskatchewan provide income-tested supple 
ments, thereby raising the guaranteed annual income of those aged 65 in excess of OAS/GIS benefits.
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began as a means-tested pension, introduced in 1927, payable to quali 
fying individuals at the age of 70. By 1951, it had become a universal 
flat-rate pension payable at age 70, and the age of eligibility was subse 
quently reduced to 65 in concert with the introduction of the Canada 
Pension Plan. The full OAS benefit is equal to $3,472 per year as of 
1994. 2 (All dollar amounts hereafter are expressed in U.S. dollars, at 
an exchange rate of 75 cents [U.S.] for each Canadian dollar.) Begin 
ning in 1989, the OAS pensions of higher income Canadians have been 
"clawed-back" at the rate of 15 percent after net income of $39,911 in 
1993.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
The Guaranteed Income Supplement is an income-tested transfer 
payment given to residents of Canada who are in receipt of the basic 
OAS pension and who have little or no other income. The GIS was 
introduced in 1966. Like OAS, GIS is financed from general tax reve 
nues. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum GIS pension was $4,127 
for singles and $5,376 for married couples. The GIS places a floor on 
the minimum income of those aged 65 and over. Unlike OAS and CPP 
pensions, GIS benefits are not subject to income tax. The implicit tax- 
back rate for GIS benefits is 50 percent; that is, for each dollar of 
income (including CPP benefits) in excess of the basic OAS pension, 
GIS benefits are reduced by 50 percent. 3
Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
The Canada Pension Plan (like Social Security in the United 
States) is a mandatory, contributory, earnings-based pension that pro 
vides coverage for the majority of workers. It was established in 
(largely) its present form in 1965. The CPP is designed to replace 25 
percent of a worker's average lifetime earnings for persons whose 
earnings are equal to or less than the average industrial wage. For per 
sons whose earnings are higher than the average industrial wage, the 
CPP is designed to replace a smaller portion of their average lifetime 
earnings. At the beginning of 1994, the maximum CPP benefit was 
$6,248 per year, or approximately 25 percent of the average industrial 
wage of $25,800. The maximum CPP benefit is paid to workers whose
Public Pension Plans 385
earnings equal or exceed the ceiling on contributions (the Year's Maxi 
mum Pensionable Earnings, or YMPE) for each year during their work 
lives.
The CPP is financed out of a payroll tax, with equal contributions 
from employers and employees. In 1994, the contribution rate for 
employers and employees was set for both at 2.6 percent of earnings 
between the Year's Basic Exemption ($2,550) and the YMPE 
($25,800).4 The average contribution was $680 in 1991. The contribu 
tion rate is scheduled to rise steadily over the next 25 years, from 5.2 
percent (combined rate) in 1994 to 10.10 percent in 2016 and to 12.73 
percent in 2030.
Prior to 1987, CPP benefits were payable at age 65 (or later, at the 
worker's option). Since 1987, CPP benefits have been payable at age 
60, on an actuarially reduced basis and subject to the requirement that 
the recipient is not working. 5 The actuarially fair reduction is designed 
to exactly compensate for the fact that the pension is received earlier 
and for a longer expected period of time. In January 1992, the majority 
of males who commenced receipt of CPP retirement benefits were 
aged 60 to 64. Indeed, the number of males commencing receipt of 
benefits at age 60 was only modestly less than the number commenc 
ing receipt at age 65. For females, the early receipt of benefits is more 
pronounced, with the number commencing receipt of CPP benefits at 
age 60 exceeding the number commencing receipt at age 65 (Health 
and Welfare Canada 1992, Table 8).
CPP benefits can be delayed until age 70, in which case annual 
benefits are actuarially increased to compensate for the fact that they 
will be received later and for a shorter expected period of time. After 
the age of 70, there is no actuarial adjustment so that there is in effect a 
penalty for delaying receipt after that age.
CPP benefits are fully taxable as a normal source of income. How 
ever, there is no clawback if the person does not retire (after attaining 
age 65) but continues to work and earn income. The only clawbacks 
are indirect: CPP income is subject to income tax and if the person 
continues to work, the person would presumably be in a higher mar 
ginal tax bracket. As well, if the person continues to work, the person 
is more likely to exceed the threshold level of income of $39,111 that 
would subject their OAS income to the 15 percent clawback. More 
importantly, if the person is eligible for the GIS supplement, the per-
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son's GIS benefits would be reduced by the 50 percent "tax-back" that 
applies to income (including CPP income) beyond the OAS 
demogrant.
Private Pension Plans (RPPs and RRSPs)
Canada's public and private pension system is generally described 
as involving three tiers: 1) the universal Old Age Security component 
consisting of the OAS demogrant and the possible GIS income-tested 
supplement; 2) the Social Insurance component involving the manda 
tory, earnings-based CPP which covers most workers; and 3) and 
employer-sponsored, occupational Registered Pension Plans (RPPs). 
The first two tiers are the public pension system, and the third is the 
private pension system.
Private, employer-sponsored RPPs are financed by employers, usu 
ally with employee contributions. 6 In 1992, 38.4 percent of the labor 
force were covered by such occupational pension plans, the coverage 
being slightly higher for males than for females (Statistics Canada 
1994, p. 16). In 1992, 90 percent of plan members were in defined-ben- 
efit plans, with 18 percent being in flat-benefit plans (predominantly in 
the unionized sector) and 72 percent being in earnings-based plans 
(usually dependent upon the individual's final years of earnings). Only 
9 percent of plan members were in defined-contribution plans. 
Although membership in both defined-benefit and defined-contribution 
plans has been growing, membership in defined-contribution plans has 
been growing at a faster rate.
Private, earnings-based pensions also exist in the form of personal 
savings through Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) that 
basically involve a deferral of taxes until the pension is withdrawn 
upon retirement. These are earnings-based in the sense that (as of 
1991) individuals are allowed to contribute up to 18 percent of their 
earned income in the previous year. The maximum contribution for 
1991 was $8,625 for individuals who did not have an RPP, or $8625 
less what is known as the "Pension Adjustment" for those who belong 
to an RPP. (The pension adjustment seeks to underscore the value of 
the pension benefit carried during the year by a member of a defined- 
benefit pension plan. Technically, it equals nine times the benefit enti-
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dement less $1,000). In 1991, 24 percent of all tax filers made RRSP 
contributions, averaging $2,172.
Contributions and Benefits from Pension Plans
As indicated in Table 2, among the different contributory pension 
plans, the CPP has the greatest number of contributors, given the man 
datory nature of such contributions. Private RPPs and tax-advantaged 
RRSPs have considerably fewer contributors. The number of contribu 
tors has grown most rapidly, however, for RRSPs. Although the CPP 
involves the greatest number of contributors, it also involves the lowest 
average contribution ($680) compared to average contributions of over 
$2,000 for both RPPs and RRSPs. This smaller average contribution 
for CPPs leads to lower total contributions for CPPs than for RRSPs, 
which—in turn—are less than contributions for RPPs. From 1981 to 
1991, the growth of total contributions has been greatest for RRSPs, 
followed by the CPP and then RPPs. 7
With respect to benefits paid under the different pension plans, 
Table 3 indicates that the CPP and the OAS/GIS have the greatest num 
ber of beneficiaries. Beneficiaries of the CPP have grown the most, 
reflecting the aging of the workforce and the tendency to retire early 
and receive the actuarially adjusted benefits after age 60. Average ben 
efits are greatest for RPPs, followed by OAS/GIS, with CPP benefits 
being the smallest. Total benefits, however, have grown the most under 
CPP, reflecting the highest growth in both the number of recipients and 
the average benefit per recipient.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income: Canada
The importance of the three public pension plans in contributing to 
retirement income is shown in Table 4. In 1988, they accounted for 38 
percent of retirement income for men and 50 percent for women. The 
earnings-based CPP, however, constitutes a smaller component for 
women than for men, reflecting the fact that women tend to have lower 
earnings (and less continuous work histories) than do men. The OAS 
and GIS benefits are not linked to labor-market earnings; hence, their 
fixed nature means that, in combination, they constitute a larger portion 
of the retirement income for women (40.0 percent) than for men (22.5
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Table 2 Contributors and Contributions of the CPP Relative to 
Employer Private Registered Pension Plans (RPP) and 
Earnings-Based Registered Retirement Savings Plans (RRSPs) 




































Working age population growth 1981-91, 14.5%
Labor force growth 1981-91, 16.8% 
Nominal GDP growth 1981-91, 86.7% 
Consumer price growth 1981-91, 67.2%
SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 9) Growth 
rates calculated using the following data series from the Statistics Canada CANSIM 
Main base: working age population, D767867; labor force, D767870; nominal GDP, 
128026; and, consumer price index, P490000.
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents 
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.
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Table 3 Benefits Paid Under Public Pension Plans (OAS, GIS, CPP) and 
































SOURCE: Calculations based on data from Statistics Canada (1994, p. 14). 
NOTE: All dollar amounts are converted to U S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents 
(U.S.) for each Canadian dollar.
Table 4 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement
Income Males and Females Age 65 and Over in Canada, in 1978 
and 1988
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SOURCE: Based on data presented in Galarneau (1991, p. 29).
a The CPP benefits include payments to surviving spouses, which amount to 32 percent 
of total CPP payments in 1988.
b Private pension income includes income from employer-sponsored Registered Pen 
sion Plans (RPP) and tax-advantaged private Registered Retirement Savings Plans 
(RRSP).
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percent). This larger portion more than offsets the lower portion from 
CPP income for women, so that overall pension income from the three 
pension programs comprises 50.5 percent of the retirement income for 
women, compared to 38.4 percent for men in 1988.
Because of their higher earnings and greater labor force attach 
ment, the earnings-based occupational pension plans (RPPs) and earn 
ings-based RRSPs also constitute a larger portion of retirement income 
for men than for women. The same applies to employment income. 
Table 5, based on more current and comprehensive data from the 1991 
census, presents a similar picture.
Figure 1 illustrates that, between 1981 and 1991, there was a rela 
tive decrease in the importance of the OAS demogrant and GIS supple 
ment as a source of pension income, in contrast to the increased 
importance of employer-sponsored RPPs and especially the public 
CPP.
Table 5 Public Pension Income as a Percentage of Total Retirement 
Income Persons Age 65 and Over in Canada in 1991








































SOURCE: Calculated from the individual files of the Public Use Sample Tapes of the 
1991 Census of Canada, weighted by the Statistics Canada sample weights.
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The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs in Canada
The income replacement rate (i.e., the ratio of postretirement to 
preretirement annual income) is a standard measure of the adequacy of 
pension benefits. As indicated previously, the benefits delivered by the 
CPP, the earnings-related component of Canada's public retirement 
system, are modest. The CPP is designed to replace 25 percent of the 
worker's average annual lifetime earnings, with a lower replacement 
rate for persons beyond the average industrial wage. As well, there is a 
maximum on the CPP benefit, equal to $6,248 per year in 1994. The 
target replacement rate of 25 percent for the CPP indicates that the 
CPP is to serve as only one component of the overall replacement rate 
of 70 percent that is widely used in Canada as the goal for retirement 
planning.
This fact, together with the flat pension provided through OAS and 
the income-tested benefit provided by the GIS, implies that income 
replacement rates from public pension programs will be high for low- 
income Canadians, and low for high-income Canadians. This result is 
readily confirmed by examining the income replaced through Canada's 
public pension programs for individuals whose lifetime earnings equal 
different fractions (or multiples) of the average industrial wage (Table 
6). 8























































a The different levels of preretirement earnings represent the indicated fraction (enclosed in parentheses) of the average industrial wage in 
Canada.
bAll amounts are expressed in U.S. dollars, at an exchange rate of 75 cents (U.S.) for each Canadian dollar, and pertain to January 1, 
1994.
c GIS benefits are income-tested and reduced by 50 percent of income in excess of OAS benefits. In these illustrations, the recipient is 
assumed to receive income only from the public pension programs. For the purpose of these illustrations, additional income-tested pen 
sions provided by some provinces are ignored
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For an individual who earns the average industrial wage (i.e., with 
preretirement earnings of $25,800 per year), 42 percent of their prere 
tirement earnings would be replaced by Canada's public pension pro 
grams. This ratio rises to 71 percent for those who earn half the 
industrial wage and falls sharply to 21 percent for those who earn twice 
the average industrial wage. The modest role of the earnings-based 
CPP is further illustrated by the fact that an individual who qualifies for 
the maximum CPP pension will also qualify for (partial) income-tested 
GIS benefits, if the individual has no other source of retirement 
income.
The OAS benefits shown in Table 6 are constant at the maximum 
amount of $3,472 because the individuals are assumed to have no post- 
retirement income other than public pension income and hence are not 
subject to the 15 percent clawback. However, GIS benefits fall as pre 
retirement earnings increase, because higher preretirement earnings 
lead to higher CPP benefits and CPP benefits are included in the 
income that is subject to the 50 percent GIS "tax-back." Therefore, 
GIS benefits fall by 50 percent of the increase in CPP benefits. When 
CPP benefits reach their maximum of $6,248, there is no further reduc 
tion of the GIS supplement and it bottoms out at $1,003 as long as the 
person has no source of income other than public pension income.
As a result of these opposing forces, total public pension benefits 
are relatively flat and do not increase much for persons with higher pre 
retirement earnings. Only earnings-based CPP benefits increase as 
preretirement earnings increase, but these are capped at a fairly modest 
level. The increase up to the cap is subject to the 50 percent "tax-back" 
of the GIS supplement. The fact that OAS benefits are flat and that 
CPP benefits are modest, capped, and effectively subject to the GIS 
"tax-back," means that total public pension benefits do not change sub 
stantially as the individual's preretirement earnings change. This 
means that the income replacement rate is very high for persons with 
low preretirement earnings and very low for persons with high prere 
tirement earnings.
Clearly, the public pension system is very "progressive," yielding 
relatively constant total benefits and hence high income replacement 
rates for low-income individuals. Furthermore, the earnings-based 
CPP component is relatively modest as evidenced by the fact that even 
when the full maximum CPP benefits are received, individuals are still
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eligible for the income-tested GIS supplement if they have no other 
source of income.
Intergenerational Transfers: Canada
The tax rates, explicit or implicit, to finance Canada's public pen 
sion programs will rise sharply in the years ahead, to offset the aging of 
the population and the increasing ratio of pensioners to active workers. 
In 1966, when the CPP was introduced, the total contribution rate was 
set at 3.6 percent, to be shared equally by employers and their employ 
ees. This rate remained in effect until 1986. Since then, the CPP con 
tribution rate has gradually increased, to 5.2 percent in 1994. This rate 
is somewhat higher than the contribution rate that would have been 
forecast for 1993 in 1966, the year that the CPP was introduced. This 
result is due to subsequent benefit enrichments and "unfavorable" 
demographic developments.
The CPP contribution rate is scheduled to rise to 10.10 percent in 
2016, 12.73 percent in 2030, and 13.18 percent in 2040. 9 These 
increases presume there will be no change to the CPP benefit formula. 
However, two points merit attention. First, future generations of work 
ers will be required to pay higher CPP contribution rates than does the 
current generation of workers, with no increase in the benefit formula. 
Second, there are no published forecasts of the implicit tax or contribu 
tion rates for OAS, GIS, and the various provincial "top-ups." Since 
these programs are also financed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, however, 
it is clear that the implicit tax or contribution rates necessary to finance 
these programmes will rise as well.
With "pay-as-you-go" financing, each generation of workers pays 
for the pensions of the previous generation. The security of CPP (and 
other public pension) benefits is linked, ultimately, to the willingness 
of the next generation of workers to pay the tax or contribution rates 
necessary to finance the level of benefits promised to the current gener 
ation.
Canadians born in 1920—who reached age 65 in 1985—will 
receive far more in benefits from the CPP than they paid in contribu 
tions. Canadians who were born in 1960—who will attain age 65 in 
2025 —will also receive more in benefits than they paid in contribu 
tions but on a more modest scale. For Canadians born after 1980, how-
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ever, lifetime CPP contributions are likely to equal or exceed CPP 
benefits. The "pension crisis" thus reflects the concern that the next 
generation of workers may choose not to honor the rules of the game 
established by the current generation because the next generation will 
be treated less favorably.
This likelihood of younger generations "breaking" an implicit 
social contract established by older generations who will benefit by 
such a contract is enhanced by a number of other factors. The younger 
generations will also be experiencing greater pressure for health and 
elder-care expenditures, associated with the aging population that is 
also in receipt of the pension income. Pressure may be enhanced by 
the possibility both of inheriting a large government deficit and assum 
ing responsibility for substantial deferred wage obligations being paid 
to public sector workers in the form of generous occupational pensions 
and seniority-based wage increases and job security. Concern that 
labor markets may not be able to absorb traditional immigrant flows 
may lead to reductions in that source of labor-force growth that could 
otherwise sustain pension obligations. The likelihood that the implicit 
pension contract is not adhered to is also enhanced by the fact that the 
"pension crisis" is not an exogenous unforseen event that leaves the 
older generation no time to adjust.
Because of these and related considerations, there has been a pro 
found shift in the past 15 years in the nature of the policy debate 
regarding public pensions in Canada. In the late 1970s, the major issue 
was whether or not to double the size of the CPP, as advocated by the 
Canadian Labour Congress and other groups. This potential initiative 
was debated at length in a National Pension Conference convened by 
the federal government in 1980. In 1991, in sharp contrast, the Organi 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) held a 
major conference on "Private Pensions and Public Policy." The first 
sentence in the "Foreword" to the conference volume (OECD 1992) 
sets the tone for the current policy debate in Canada:
Government interest in relying more on private arrangements and 
less on public pensions for income in retirement appears to be 
increasing across OECD countries. Old-age pensions currently 
are the largest social policy expenditure in public budgets, and 
their share of public costs is expected to grow in the years ahead.
396 Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando
Clearly, the potential financial problems and the intergenerational 
transfers associated with public pension plans has redirected attention 
from public to private pensions.
PUBLIC PENSION BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES
A brief treatment of the U.S. public pension system is given here, 
highlighting the main similarities and differences with the Canadian 
system.
Social Security (OASDI)
The United States does not have an equivalent of the first tier of the 
pension system in Canada—a universal demogrant like the OAS and 
income-tested supplement like the GIS. The U.S. Social Security 
through Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI), cover 
ing over 90 percent of the U.S. workforce, is broadly comparable to the 
second tier of Canada's system, the CPP. OASDI, which dates back to 
1935, consists of three components: Old Age or retirement (OA), Sur 
vivor (S), and Disability (DI) benefits. OASDI is financed by a payroll 
tax with equal contributions by the employer and employee. In 1994, 
the total contribution rate was set at 12.4 percent of earnings up to a 
ceiling of $60,600. 10
The full Old Age Security retirement benefit is available to 
employees who are fully insured by the year of their retirement.'' For 
individuals born in 1937 or earlier, the normal retirement age (that is, 
the age at which unreduced social security benefits are payable) is 65. 
For those born after 1937, the normal retirement age is gradually being 
increased. For those born in 1960 or later, the normal retirement age 
will be age 67. Retirement benefits are available to individuals as early 
as age 62 on an actuarially reduced basis. Benefits are increased for 
those working beyond the normal retirement age, up to age 70.
The pension benefit is based on the worker's Averaged Indexed 
Monthly Earnings (AIME) to which a formula is applied to determine 
the Primary Insurance Amount (PI A). The PI A is subject to an annual 
cost-of-living adjustment. Up to 85 percent of Social Security benefits
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are subject to income taxes for persons whose income exceeds a certain 
threshold amount. The exact proportion subject to taxes depends upon 
such factors as marital/tax filing status, and combined income from 
earnings, tax-exempt interest, and social security.
Those who continue employment after commencing receipt of 
benefits will have their benefit subject to a clawback. For those 
between the ages of 65 and 69, the benefit is reduced by one-third of 
earnings above $11,160 (in 1994). Those under age 65 experience a 
reduction in social security benefits of 50 cents for every dollar of earn 
ings above $8,040.
Fully insured individuals and their spouses qualify for health bene 
fits under Medicare, which covers in-patient hospital care, home nurs 
ing and health care services, and some types of hospice care. 
Deductibles and coinsurance payments apply for certain services. 
Those qualifying for Medicare may also opt (at a fee of $41.10 per 
month in 1994) for supplementary health benefits which cover a num 
ber of services not covered by the basic Medicare plan. There is an 
annual deductible and coinsurance for most charges.
Family members of persons receiving Social Security are also eli 
gible for partial payments. Eligible family members include: spouses 
(including divorced spouses) who are at least 62 years old; spouses of 
any age who are caring for a child under the age of 16 or caring for a 
child who became disabled before the age of 22; unmarried dependent 
children (and sometimes grandchildren) under the age of 18 (under age 
19 if the child is still in high school); and children of any age if they 
became disabled before age 22. The sum of these benefits are subject 
to a Family Maximum Benefit level. If the Social Security recipient is 
deceased, more generous survivor benefits are available to a slightly 
broader group of family members.
Pension Income as Component of Retirement Income: 
United States
Table 7 shows the relative contribution of OASDI benefits to the 
incomes of older Americans in 1979, 1989, and 1992. The median 
income level of those 65 years of age and older was $8,795 in 1979, 
$10,765 in 1989, and $10,200 in 1992. OASDI benefits accounted for 
about 42 percent of retirement income in both 1979 and 1992. The rel-
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Table 7 Contribution of Public Pension Benefits to Incomes of Americans 
Aged 65 and Over, 1979,1989, and 1992
























SOURCE: Yablonski and Silverman (1994, p. 29).
ative share of income from investment was about four percentage 
points higher in 1989 than in the other two years, presumably reflecting 
the relatively high returns on investment vehicles experienced at the 
time.
While definitional differences preclude strict comparisons with the 
Canadian figures given in Tables 4 and 5, some comparisons can be 
suggested. The share of retirement income derived from sources other 
than public pensions are remarkably similar in the two countries. This 
is best seen by comparing Table 5 for Canada with the latest year fig 
ures in Table 7 for the United States. The components are usually 
within 1-3 percentage points of each other. The overall public pension 
components, at about 41 percent of retirement income, are almost iden 
tical between OASDI in the United States and the combined OAS/GIS 
and CPP in Canada. Because the OAS/GIS in Canada is almost twice 
as large as the CPP component, this means that Canada delivers its 
public pensions in a more "progressive" fashion—that is, universal 
(OAS) and income-tested (GIS). As highlighted previously, the earn 
ings-based CPP component in Canada is extremely modest.
The Income Replacement of Public Pension Programs 
in the United States
The effect of this greater progressivity in Canada as compared with 
the United States is highlighted when comparisons are made of the 
extent to which public pensions replace preretirement earnings for 
those who retire and have no further earnings. Like the Canadian sys-
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Table 8 Income Replaced by Public Pension Programs in the 
United States
Individual's earnings,




















'The OA benefit calculation assumes that the worker retired at age 65 in 1994 with 
average indexed annual earnings shown in the first column.
tern, the U.S. Old Age benefit program is designed to replace a greater 
proportion of preretirement earnings for lower income workers. The 
effect of this policy is demonstrated in Table 8, which shows the 
income replacement rates for individuals with preretirement earnings 
levels corresponding to the Canadian levels given earlier in Table 6. 
Individuals earning the average Canadian industrial wage of $25,800 
would have almost 50 percent of their preretirement earnings replaced 
by the OAS benefit. The replacement rate is higher at 79 percent for 
those earning one-quarter of the average industrial wage, and is lower 
at 27 percent for those who earn twice the industrial wage.
While the U.S. public pension system has elements of progressiv- 
ity, it is much less so than the Canadian system. For persons at one- 
quarter of the industrial wage, the Canadian system replaces 130 per 
cent of preretirement income, as compared with 79 percent in the 
United States. For persons at twice the industrial wage, the Canadian 
system replaces only 21 percent of preretirement income, as compared 
with 27 percent in the United States.
Inter generational Transfers: United States
As of 1994, it has been estimated that the OASDI will require 
funding from other government revenues by the year 2013 and will
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become insolvent by 2029 (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 1994). An increase in the contribution rate from the present 
12.4 percent to 19.0 percent of earnings by 2070 would be required to 
fund the benefits at current levels. No contribution rate increases have 
been scheduled.
As a result of the 1983 reforms to the Social Security Act, the nor 
mal retirement age of individuals born after 1937 has been gradually 
increased. For those born in 1938, the normal age of retirement is 65 
years and 2 months. For those born in 1960 and after, the normal 
retirement age is 67. Assuming that the normal retirement benefit 
remains at its January 1, 1995 level of $884, the impact of increasing 
the normal retirement age from 65 to 67 has been estimated to result in 
a reduction in the monthly benefit for an individual who chooses to 
retire at age 65, with average indexed monthly earnings of $2,000, 
from $884 to $766. This 13.3 percent reduction is due to the fact that 
those retiring at age 65 will be doing so early, given the increase in the 
normal retirement age to 67, and thus their benefit will be subject to the 
reduction formula applied to the benefits of those who retire prior to 
the normal retirement age. Similarly, those retiring at age 67 will 
receive a 6 percent smaller monthly payment in comparison to the pre- 
reform benefit because the increase in benefits due to late retirement 
would not be applied given the older normal retirement age (Salisbury 
and Silverman 1994).
POTENTIAL INCENTIVE EFFECTS
While a full mapping of the incentive effects of the public pension 
schemes in Canada and the United States is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, some broad characterizations can be suggested. More com 
plete discussions of theory and empirical research into the work incen 
tive effects of social security benefits can be found in popular labor 
economics texts such as Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) and Gunderson 
and Riddell (1993), and they are also contained in broader reviews of 
the pension literature including Mitchell and Fields (1982) and Lazear 
(1986).
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Work Incentives
An analysis of the financial incentives contained in public (and pri 
vate) pension benefits on the decision to retire from the labor market 
typically begins by calculating the discounted present value of the 
future stream of such benefits, commonly termed "pension wealth," at 
different points in the lifetime of the worker. In essence, pension 
wealth at time t is a measure of the future stream of pension payments 
due to the worker if the worker were to retire or otherwise terminate 
participation in the pension plan at time t. Other factors constant, it is 
assumed that workers seek to maximize their pension wealth.
The period-by-period changes in pension wealth, termed "pension 
accruals," embody the magnitudes of the financial incentives for the 
worker to remain in the labor force earlier in the life-cycle and then 
retire later in the life-cycle. For pension plans based on, for example, 
average earnings over some number of years of pensionable employ 
ment, an additional year of service generally brings about an increase 
in the monthly benefit payable to the worker. This increases pension 
wealth. Working against this, however, is the inevitable fact that every 
year the pension plan member gets a year older and the remaining 
years over which benefits can be received falls. In other words, over 
any period of time, while the monthly benefit payable to the worker 
may increase, the amount of time the worker has left to collect the ben 
efit falls. As workers age, depending on the specific benefit formula of 
the pension plan, the positive impact on pension wealth of labor-mar 
ket work becomes increasingly offset by the reduced amount of time 
remaining to receive the benefit. At some point, which again is influ 
enced by the specific benefit formulae contained in the pension plan, 
pension payments foregone by not retiring are not offset by increased 
monthly benefits, and pension wealth accruals become negative—that 
is, pension wealth falls with increased work. At some point in time, the 
two effects are completely offsetting, at which point pension wealth is 
maximized. Delaying receipt of benefits beyond this point is associ 
ated with negative pension wealth accruals and, clearly, reductions in 
pension wealth (see Kotlikoff and Wise 1987; Lazear and Moore 1988; 
Pesando and Gunderson 1988; and Pesando, Hyatt and Gunderson 
1992). Thus, as long as pension wealth accruals are positive, there is 
an incentive to continue work, or stated differently, there is no pension
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penalty to continued labor market employment. Holding pension 
wealth accruals constant, increases in pension wealth are expected to 
be associated with younger retirement ages.
If Social Security benefits are unexpectedly increased, but the post- 
retirement income clawback, the preretirement labor -market wage and 
other factors are all held constant, economic theory predicts that the 
retirement age will fall—that is, the increase in Social Security benefits 
will have a pure wealth effect, encouraging workers to consume lei 
sure. Anderson, Burkhauser, and Quinn (1986) estimated that unantic 
ipated increase in Social Security wealth significantly increases the 
probability of retiring earlier and significantly decreases the probabil 
ity of retiring later, for a sample of men aged 58 to 63 in 1969. 12
Some public pension plans, like U.S. Social Security, have postre- 
tirement earnings tests such that pension payments are clawed-back by 
some proportion for each dollar of labor-market income (usually over 
some threshold amount). These earnings tests effectively reduce the 
wage net of pension benefit reductions, thereby reducing the opportu 
nity cost of retirement. Policies that reduce the clawback would 
increase time in labor-market work, thereby increasing the expected 
retirement age, but they would also result in greater wealth, thereby 
reducing the expected retirement age. Which of the two effects domi 
nates is an empirical question that Gustman and Steinmeier (1991) 
addressed through a simulation analysis. Their results suggest that 
eliminating the Social Security clawback would have a small positive 
effect on the labor supply of those in the 65-69 age group.
In summary, Social Security can be expected to discourage contin 
ued labor-market work (i.e., encourage retirement) both because the 
income transfer enables the individual to afford to retire and because 
the clawback reduces the net returns to continued work. The income or 
wealth effect may be small because it is largely anticipated and hence 
can affect labor-supply decisions throughout the life-cycle, not just 
when the income is received after the normal retirement age. Never 
theless, income that is guaranteed in the later part of the life-cycle can 
be particularly important in facilitating retirement since it does not 
require the uncertainty of liquidating assets to pay for retirement— 
assets that can be bequeathed if not used and can be used up too 
quickly if one lives longer than expected.
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While Social Security can discourage labor-force participation 
after the age of normal retirement, it can encourage labor-force partici 
pation in earlier stages of the life-cycle to build eligibility for the bene 
fits. Furthermore, the wealth effects emanating from the inter- 
generational transfers can affect retirement decisions. Specifically, the 
older generations who are recipients of the transfers can more easily 
afford to retire. Future generations who are net payers may be less 
likely to afford to retire.
As indicated previously, the Canadian public pension system has a 
different set of incentives. The intergenerational wealth redistribution 
effects are likely to be similar because both involve transfers from 
younger generations to older generations. However, the more progres 
sive nature of the Canadian system implies that lower income people in 
Canada may more easily be able to afford to retire.
More importantly, the absence of direct clawbacks on CPP in Can 
ada means that there are less disincentives to keep working past the 
normal retirement age. 13 For lower income people who would other 
wise receive the GIS supplement, however, the 50 percent clawback for 
that component could discourage continued work. In essence, there 
may be some tendency for the Canadian system to encourage retire 
ment amongst lower income persons, both because the progressive 
nature of the system means that they can afford to retire and because 
the 50 percent clawback of the GIS supplement is likely to discourage 
work most amongst low-income persons. Overall, however, the 
absence of a direct clawback on CPP in Canada should mean that there 
is more incentive to continue working and not to retire.
Interestingly, the United States appears to facilitate continued 
working past the normal retirement age because of the legislated ban 
on mandatory retirement. However, it discourages continued working 
through the clawback of Social Security. In contrast, mandatory retire 
ment in Canada is generally not banned 14 ; however, continued labor- 
force participation is not discouraged through tax-back features of the 
public pension system (except possibly for low-income persons as 
indicated).
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Payroll Taxes and the Demand for Labor
While most attention on incentive effects focuses on the labor-sup 
ply side, the payroll taxes used to finance the CPP in Canada and 
Social Security in the United States can also have important incentive 
effects reducing the demand for labor. The issue is complicated, how 
ever, by the fact that payroll taxes may be shifted back to labor in the 
form of lower wages in return for the pension benefits that are financed 
by the payroll tax.
Dahlby (1992), based on previous econometric studies, concluded 
that in the short-run, workers bear less than 50 percent of the payroll 
tax burden, increasing to at least two-thirds in the longer term.
Payroll taxes can affect the demand not only for the overall labor 
input but also for the different components of the labor input. Specifi 
cally, the ceilings on the payroll tax mean that the tax does not apply to 
earnings beyond the ceiling. This can create an incentive for firms who 
have employees at the ceiling to work them long hours (since no fur 
ther payroll taxes are incurred) rather than to hire new recruits and to 
incur the payroll taxes. In essence, the ceilings create an element of 
quasi-fixed costs of employment that can discourage new employment 
and encourage firms to demand longer hours from existing employees. 
This can be a contributing factor, for example, to the tendency to work 
incumbent workers overtime hours on a regular basis rather than hiring 
new employees. Since the ceiling on CPP contributions in Canada is 
reached sooner (i.e., at $25,800) than the ceiling on Social Security 
contributions in the United States (i.e., $60,000), this constraint should 
be more binding in Canada than in the United States.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
There is a clear trend to early retirement that exists in both Canada 
and the United States. In both countries, in the immediate post-war 
period, the labor-force participation rates of males aged 65 and over 
were in the neighborhood of 47 percent. By the early 1990s, these had 
fallen to well under 20 percent and closer to 10 percent in Canada. 
Participation rates of older workers have consistently been higher in
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the United States than in Canada. Of note, however, is the fact that 
after 1985, U.S. participation rates began moving upwards, while 
Canadian rates continued their downward trend. Whether this reflects 
the impact of the legislated ban on mandatory retirement in the United 
States (a ban that did not occur in Canada) is an interesting and impor 
tant question.
Overall, the following general conclusions emerge from this analy 
sis.
• In addition to the earnings-based CPP (broadly comparable to 
OASDI in the United States), the Canadian public pension system 
also has a universal demogrant, the OAS, payable to all Canadi 
ans 65 and over, and an income-tested supplement, the GIS.
• As a source of retirement income, the OAS demogrant and the 
GIS supplement are more important than is the labor-market- 
based, earnings-related CPP. In fact, the target income replace 
ment rate of the CPP is designed to be modest, at 25 percent of 
the average industrial wage. As a result, an individual who quali 
fies for the maximum CPP benefit, but who has no additional 
income other than the OAS pension, would qualify for some 
income-tested GIS benefits.
• The U.S. public pension system of OASDI, which is broadly 
comparable to the Canadian CPP, does not have a universal 
demogrant like the OAS, nor an income-tested supplement like 
the GIS. In spite of these differences, the public pension systems 
in both countries are remarkably similar as a source of retirement 
income, accounting for slightly over 40 percent of retirement 
income in both countries. Canada simply delivers more of its 
public pension under universal and income-tested components, 
while the United States delivers its public pension largely through 
the labor-market-related, earnings-based component.
• In both countries, the public pension systems are progressive or 
redistributive in that they involve higher income replacement 
rates for low-income persons and lower income replacement rates 
for higher income persons. In Canada, however, this is much 
more prominent. This reflects the fact that total public pension 
benefits are almost constant with respect to income: the OAS
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demogrant is completely flat and the CPP component, which is 
earnings-related, is modest, capped, and effectively subject to the 
50 percent GIS clawback because CPP benefits are included in 
total income for purposes of that clawback.
• In the United States, the continuation of working past a normal 
retirement age is facilitated by the legislated ban on mandatory 
retirement, but it is discouraged by the clawbacks on Social Secu 
rity that range from 0.33 to 0.50, depending upon age and 
income. In Canada, in contrast, mandatory retirement is not gen 
erally banned, but continued work is also not discouraged in the 
sense that there is no direct clawback from the CPP. There is only 
an indirect clawback for low-income people in the sense that any 
additional income (including CPP income) is subject to the 50 
percent clawback of the GIS supplement.
• Payroll taxes that are used to finance public pensions can reduce 
the overall demand for labor. The ceilings on such payroll taxes 
can also create a quasi-fixed hiring cost that discourages new hir 
ing (that would be subject to the payroll tax) and that encourages 
working the existing workforce long hours (since no further pay 
roll taxes are incurred once the ceiling is reached). The impact of 
such taxes on the demand for labor, and on the demand for hours 
versus new hires, is complicated by the fact that the cost of a 
large portion of the payroll tax is ultimately shifted back to labor.
• In both Canada and the United States, public pension programs 
contain significant intergenerational transfers, to current from 
future generations, creating some uncertainty as to the willing 
ness and ability of future generations to sustain future pension 
"obligations."
These conclusions highlight the substantial degree of variation in 
the key parameters of the public pension systems in the United States 
and Canada. This variation can potentially be exploited to understand 
examine the behavioral effects of public pensions in a way which is 
seldom possible in a single jurisdiction, unless that jurisdiction experi 
enced a major change in policy regimes. This echoes the sentiment 
expressed by Card and Freeman (1993, p. 2) that, "(i)f one wants to 
study the impact of differing unemployment insurance, income mainte-
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nance, or labor laws on economic behavior and outcomes, comparisons 
of Canadian and U.S. experiences hold out the promise of relatively 
straightforward inferences."
There are at least two areas of research on public pensions that 
have the potential to realize some of the promise suggested by Card 
and Freeman. The first is an examination of the comparative labor 
demand effects induced by financing public pensions exclusively 
through a payroll tax, as is the case in the United States, or a combina 
tion of a payroll tax and general revenues, as is the case in Canada. It 
would also be possible to examine the extent of disemployment in Can 
ada that results from the quasi-fixed cost of hiring created by the rela 
tively low payroll tax ceiling in Canada. These features have 
competing implications for employment and hours. This first suggests 
that Canadian firms will hire more workers than U.S. firms, while the 
second suggests that rather than hire new workers, firms will try to 
amortize the quasi-fixed cost of the payroll tax by working its existing 
workforce longer hours. However, as we cautioned earlier, the impact 
on labor demand of a payroll tax depends on the ultimate incidence of 
the tax, which some evidence suggests may fall largely on workers in 
the form of lower wages.
Second, on the supply side, useful research would consider the 
impact of pension generosity on labor-force participation. It would be 
expected that labor-force withdrawal rates would be higher for low 
lifetime income earners in Canada than for their counterparts in the 
United States. Confounding considerations, such as the fact that man 
datory retirement is still permitted in some provinces, would have to be 
addressed in the research design.
Both Canada and the United States have exhibited a dramatic trend 
towards retirement as exhibited by the falling labor-force participation 
rates of males age 65 and older. The role of public pensions (as well as 
private pensions and mandatory retirement policies) in stimulating, or 
facilitating, this trend remains an important topic of future research.
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Notes
1. The Government of Canada also provides an additional tax credit (equal in 1993 
to 54 percent of the basic personal tax credit) for those age 65 or over and addi 
tional tax credit for the first $750 of private pension income. In Quebec, the Can 
ada Pension Plan is replaced by its equivalent, the Quebec Pension Plan.
2. There is also a Spouse's Allowance, which is income-tested and payable from age 
60 to 65 to eligible widows, widowers, and spouses of OAS pensioners. In 1993, 
the maximum annual allowance was $6,160 to spouses and $6,801 to widows and 
widowers.
3. Additional income-tested benefits for those aged 65 and over provided by several 
provinces are also exempt from the GIS tax-back provisions. Indeed, receipt of 
GIS benefits is generally used as the eligibility criterion for these provincial sup 
plements. As an example of a provincial supplement, Ontario paid a maximum 
supplement of $83.00 per month in 1994 to single retirees through its Guaranteed 
Annual Income System (GAINS) program The supplement is scaled down based 
on a formula which takes into account other sources of income, such as interest 
and dividend payments, foreign pensions, CPP benefits, employment income, 
unemployment benefits, workers' compensation payments, and net rents from 
property.
4. The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions. The CPP also 
contains death (including surviving spouse's) and disability benefits.
5. For those between the ages 60 and 65 who opt for early retirement, the normal 
retirement benefit is reduced by 0.5 percent for each month that early retirement 
precedes normal retirement to a maximum reduction of 30 percent. The worker 
must have substantially ceased working, meaning that the worker's employment 
earnings must be less than the maximum CPP benefit payable at age 65.
6. Of course, these costs can be shifted back to employees in the form of lower com 
pensating cash wages in return for more generous pension benefits. Evidence on 
such cost shifting in union-based flat benefit plans in Canada is given in Gunder 
son, Hyatt, and Pesando (1992).
7. The contribution growth rate is expressed in nominal terms. This facilitates com 
parison with the CPP growth rate, which reflects both increases in the earnings 
base and increases in the contribution rate.
8. The retirement benefit payable under the CPP is linked to the worker's average 
lifetime earnings, updated to the three years prior to the worker's retirement The 
mechanics are as follows: The ratio of the worker's earnings to the YMPE (set 
equal to one if earnings exceed the YMPE) is averaged for each year after the 
worker turned age 18 (or 1996). The resulting fraction (or the value one) is multi 
plied by the YMPE average for the year of retirement and the two previous years. 
This is called the worker's Average Pensionable Earnings (AYMPE). The proce 
dure, in effect, updates the worker's lifetime earnings to their current equivalent. 
The worker's CPP benefit is equal to 25 percent of the worker's AYMPE. (If a 
worker earned more than the YMPE in every year, for, example, the worker's pen-
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sion would equal 25 percent of the YMPE in the years in which the worker was 
63, 64, and 65. If the worker has contributed for more than 10 years, 15 percent of 
the months in the contribution period can be dropped before the worker's AYMPE 
is calculated. In effect, this allows the worker to eliminate the periods of lowest 
earnings.
9. The contribution rates through the year 2016 were set in the 1990-1991 review of 
contribution rates, per agreement among the federal and provincial ministers of 
finance.
10. The self-employed pay both employer and employee contributions.
11. A fully insured individual is one who has (or whose spouse has) earned 40 credits 
in the year in which they reach age 62. In 1994, a credit is earned for every $620 
of employment earnings, up to a maximum of four credits per year. The amount 
of employment earnings required to earn a credit increases annually, to reflect 
changes in the average industrial wage.
12. For an excellent discussion of these issues, see Ippolito (1990). Krueger and Pis- 
chke (1992) find only small effects of increases in Social Security wealth on 
labor-force participation of older workers.
13. As described earlier, to draw CPP benefits before age 65 an individual in Canada 
must have substantially stop working.
14. Except in the federal jurisdiction, which covers about 10 percent of workers, and 
in the provinces of Manitoba and Quebec.
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